

Workshop  
“Mechanism Design Without Transfers”

June 15 - 19, 2026

organized by  
Anna Bogomolnaia, Florian Brandl

*Time measurement: CEST*

• **Monday, June 15, 2026**

14:00 - 14:05	<i>Welcome by HIM Director Stefan Müller</i>
14:05 - 15:05	<b>Marek Pycia</b> <i>Evaluating with Statistics: Which Outcome Measures Differentiate Among Matching Mechanisms?</i>
15:05 - 15:30	<i>Coffee break</i>
15:30 - 16:30	<b>Ravi Jagadeesan</b> <i>Publication Design with Incentives in Mind</i>
16:30 - 17:30	<b>Joseph Root</b> <i>How to Beat FCFS</i>
afterwards	<i>Get-Together</i>

• **Tuesday, June 16, 2026**

09:30 - 10:30	<b>Péter Biró</b> <i>Smart Lotteries in School Choice: Ex-Ante Pareto-Improvement with Ex-Post Stability</i>
10:30 - 11:00	<i>Coffee break</i>
11:00 - 12:00	<b>Felix Brandt</b> <i>Randomized Mechanisms Beyond Expected Utility</i>
12:00 - 14:00	<i>Lunch break</i>
14:00 - 15:00	<b>William Phan</b> <i>Equal Opportunity in School Choice Lotteries</i>
15:00 - 15:30	<i>Coffee break</i>
15:30 - 16:30	<b>Yeon-Koo Che</b> <i>Dynamic Market Design</i>

16:30 - 17:30 | **Deniz Kattwinkel**  
*TBA*

• **Wednesday, June 17, 2026**

09:00 - 10:00 | **Tangren Feng**  
*Interim Strategy-Proof Voting*

10:00 - 10:30 | *Coffee break*

10:30 - 11:30 | **Hervé Moulin**  
*Compromises in Collective Choice: The Veto Solution*

11:30 - 12:30 | **Patrick Lederer**  
*Approximate Strategyproofness in Approval-Based Budget Division*

12:30 - 14:00 | *Lunch break*

• **Thursday, June 18, 2026**

09:30 - 10:30 | **Patrick Lahr**  
*Extreme Points in Multi-Dimensional Screening*

10:30 - 11:00 | *Coffee break*

11:00 - 12:00 | **Anna Bogomolnaia**  
*Discrete Fair Division Under Objective Constraints*

12:00 - 14:00 | *Lunch break*

14:00 - 15:00 | **Jacob Coreno**  
*Axioms for Top Trading Cycles in Multi-Object Reallocation*

15:00 - 15:30 | *Coffee break*

15:30 - 16:30 | **Axel Niemeier**  
*Optimal Allocation with Peer Information*

16:30 - 17:30 | **Jay Sethuraman**  
*TBA*

• **Friday, June 19, 2026**

09:00 - 10:00 | **Alexander Westkamp**  
*Marginal Mechanisms for Balanced Exchange*

10:00 - 10:30 | *Coffee break*

10:30 - 11:30 | **Szilvia Papai**  
*Pareto-Efficient Matching with Gradual Acceptances*

11:30 - 12:30 | **Olivier Tercieux**  
*Dynamic Market Design in Large Economies: Foundations and Applications to the Design of Dynamic Incentives*