
**Preliminary Schedule for the Workshop
“Mechanism Design and Information Design”**

June 29 - July 3, 2026

organized by
Laura Doval, Andreas Kleiner

Time measurement: CEST

- **Monday, June 29, 2026**

14:00 - 14:05	<i>Welcome by HIM Director Stefan Müller</i>
14:05 - 15:05	Elliot Lipnowski (Yale University) <i>Agreeing to Implement</i> (joint with Marina Halac and Doron Ravid)
15:05 - 15:30	<i>Coffee break</i>
15:30 - 16:30	Maren Vairo (University of Pennsylvania) <i>Information Design and Screening without Transfers</i>
16:30 - 17:30	Jan Knoepfle (Queen Mary University of London) <i>Who and How? Adverse Selection and Flexible Moral Hazard</i> (joint with Henrique Castro-Pires and Deniz Kattwinkel)
afterwards	<i>Get-Together</i>

- **Tuesday, June 30, 2026**

09:30 - 10:30	Nenad Kos (Bocconi University) <i>Inference from Outcomes in the Market for Lemons</i> (joint with Francesco Dilme)
10:30 - 11:00	<i>Group Photo and Coffee break</i>
11:00 - 12:00	Agathe Pernoud (University of Chicago) <i>Bundling against Learning</i> (joint with Frank Yang)
12:00 - 14:00	<i>Lunch break</i>
14:00 - 15:00	Nima Haghpanah (Yale University) <i>Selling Evidence Bit by Bit</i>
15:00 - 15:30	<i>Coffee break</i>

15:30 - 16:30	Fedor Sandomirskiy (Princeton University) <i>Delegation in Strategic Environments and Equilibrium Uniqueness</i> (joint with Ben Wincelberg)
16:30 - 17:30	Tan Gan (London School of Economics) <i>Screening for Choice Set</i> (joint with Yingkai Li)

- **Wednesday, July 1, 2026**

09:00 - 10:00	Jacopo Perego (Columbia University) <i>Privacy for Sale: Anarchy, Ban or Market?</i> (joint with Piotr Dworzak and Laura Veldkamp)
10:00 - 10:30	<i>Coffee break</i>
10:30 - 11:30	Pia Ennuschat (Universitat Pompeu Fabra) <i>Targeted Information Design</i>
11:30 - 12:30	Vasiliki Skreta (UT Austin and UCL) <i>Audience Design with Transfers and Ordeals</i> (joint with Suraj Malladi)

- **Thursday, July 2, 2026**

09:30 - 10:30	Kai Hao Yang (Yale University) <i>Stochastic Optimization and Coupling</i> (joint with Frank Yang)
10:30 - 11:00	<i>Coffee break</i>
11:00 - 12:00	Eduardo Perez-Richet (Sciences Po) <i>TBA</i>
12:00 - 14:00	<i>Lunch break</i>
14:00 - 15:00	Ian Ball (Massachusetts Institute of Technology) <i>Competitive Sequential Screening</i> (joint with Jan Knoepfle and Deniz Kattwinkel)
15:00 - 15:30	<i>Coffee break</i>
15:30 - 16:30	Sulagna Dasgupta (Cornell University) <i>TBA</i>
16:30 - 17:30	Marek Pycia (University of Zurich) <i>Mechanism Design with Information Leakage</i> (joint with Samuel Häfner and Haoyuan Zeng)
from 19:00 on	<i>Dinner: Restaurant Nees</i>

- **Friday, July 3, 2026**

09:00 - 10:00	Paula Onuchic (London School of Economics) <i>TBA</i>
10:00 - 10:30	<i>Coffee break</i>

- 10:30 - 11:30 | **Ilya Segal** (Stanford University)
The Limits of Auctions under Ex-Ante Collusion (joint with Ravi Jagadeesan and Alex Tordjman)
- 11:30 - 12:30 | **Ravi Jagadeesan** (Stanford University)
Mechanism Design with Collusion: Welfare Guarantees under Property Rights (joint with Ilya Segal and Alex Tordjman)