

Workshop
“Mechanism Design and Information Design”

June 29 - July 3, 2026

organized by
Laura Doval, Andreas Kleiner

Time measurement: CEST

• **Monday, June 29, 2026**

14:00 - 14:05	<i>Welcome by HIM Director Stefan Müller</i>
14:05 - 15:05	Ian Ball (Massachusetts Institute of Technology) <i>Competitive Sequential Screening</i> (joint with Jan Knoepfle and Deniz Kattwinkel)
15:05 - 15:30	<i>Coffee break</i>
15:30 - 16:30	Maren Vairo (University of Pennsylvania) <i>Information Design and Screening without Transfers</i>
16:35 - 17:35	Jan Knoepfle (Queen Mary University of London) <i>Who and How? Adverse Selection and Flexible Moral Hazard</i> (joint with Henrique Castro-Pires and Deniz Kattwinkel)
afterwards	<i>Get-Together</i>

• **Tuesday, June 30, 2026**

09:30 - 10:30	Nenad Kos (Bocconi University) <i>Inference from Outcomes in the Market for Lemons</i> (joint with Francesco Dilme)
10:30 - 11:00	<i>Group Photo and Coffee break</i>
11:00 - 12:00	Agathe Pernoud (University of Chicago) <i>Bundling against Learning</i> (joint with Frank Yang)
12:00 - 14:00	<i>Lunch break</i>
14:00 - 15:00	Nima Haghpanah (Yale University) <i>Selling Evidence Bit by Bit</i>
15:00 - 15:30	<i>Coffee break</i>

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| 15:30 - 16:35 | Fedor Sandomirskiy (Princeton University)
<i>Delegation in Strategic Environments and Equilibrium Uniqueness</i> (joint with Ben Winzelberg) |
| 16:35 - 17:30 | Tan Gan (London School of Economics)
<i>Screening for Choice Set</i> (joint with Yingkai Li) |

• **Wednesday, July 1, 2026**

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| 09:00 - 10:00 | Jacopo Perego (Columbia University)
<i>Privacy for Sale: Anarchy, Ban or Market?</i> (joint with Piotr Dworczak and Laura Veldkamp) |
| 10:00 - 10:30 | <i>Coffee break</i> |
| 10:30 - 11:30 | Pia Ennuschat (Universitat Pompeu Fabra)
<i>Targeted Information Design</i> |
| 11:35 - 12:35 | Vasiliki Skreta (UT Austin and UCL)
<i>Audience Design with Transfers and Ordeals</i> (joint with Suraj Malladi) |

• **Thursday, July 2, 2026**

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| 09:30 - 10:30 | Kai Hao Yang (Yale University)
<i>Stochastic Optimization and Coupling</i> (joint with Frank Yang) |
| 10:30 - 11:00 | <i>Coffee break</i> |
| 11:00 - 12:00 | Eduardo Perez-Richet (Sciences Po)
<i>Non-market screening with investment</i> (joint with Victor Augias) |
| 12:00 - 14:00 | <i>Lunch break</i> |
| 14:00 - 15:00 | Elliot Lipnowski (Yale University)
<i>Agreeing to Implement</i> (joint with Marina Halac and Doron Ravid) |
| 15:00 - 15:30 | <i>Coffee break</i> |
| 15:30 - 16:30 | Sulagna Dasgupta (Cornell University)
<i>TBA</i> |
| 16:35 - 17:35 | Marek Pycia (University of Zurich)
<i>Mechanism Design with Information Leakage</i> (joint with Samuel Häfner and Haoyuan Zeng) |
| from 19:00 on | <i>Dinner: Restaurant Nees</i> |

• **Friday, July 3, 2026**

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| 09:00 - 10:00 | Paula Onuchic (London School of Economics)
<i>Separating the Wheat from the Chaf</i> (joint with Johannes Hörner) |
| 10:00 - 10:30 | <i>Coffee break</i> |

- 10:30 - 11:30 | **Ilya Segal** (Stanford University)
The Limits of Auctions under Ex-Ante Collusion (joint with Ravi Jagadeesan and Alex Tordjman)
- 11:35 - 12:35 | **Ravi Jagadeesan** (Stanford University)
Mechanism Design with Collusion: Welfare Guarantees under Property Rights (joint with Ilya Segal and Alex Tordjman)