

Workshop
“Mechanism Design and Information Design”

June 29 - July 3, 2026

organized by
Laura Doval, Andreas Kleiner

Time measurement: CEST

• **Monday, June 29, 2026**

14:00 - 14:05	<i>Welcome by HIM Director Stefan Müller</i>
14:05 - 15:05	Elliot Lipnowski (Yale University) <i>Agreeing to Implement</i> (joint with Marina Halac and Doron Ravid)
15:05 - 15:30	<i>Coffee break</i>
15:30 - 16:30	Maren Vairo (University of Pennsylvania) <i>Information Design and Screening without Transfers</i>
16:30 - 17:30	Jan Knoepfle (Queen Mary University of London) <i>Who and How? Adverse Selection and Flexible Moral Hazard</i> (joint with Henrique Castro-Pires and Deniz Kattwinkel)
afterwards	<i>Get-Together</i>

• **Tuesday, June 30, 2026**

09:30 - 10:30	Nenad Kos (Bocconi University) <i>Inference from Outcomes in the Market for Lemons</i> (joint with Francesc Dilme)
10:30 - 11:00	<i>Group Photo and Coffee break</i>
11:00 - 12:00	Agathe Pernoud (University of Chicago) <i>Bundling against Learning</i> (joint with Frank Yang)
12:00 - 14:00	<i>Lunch break</i>
14:00 - 15:00	Nima Haghpanah (Yale University) <i>Selling Evidence Bit by Bit</i>
15:00 - 15:30	<i>Coffee break</i>
15:30 - 16:30	Fedor Sandomirskiy (Princeton University) <i>Delegation in Strategic Environments and Equilibrium Uniqueness</i> (joint with Ben Wincelberg)

16:30 - 17:30 | **Tan Gan** (London School of Economics)
Screening for Choice Set (joint with Yingkai Li)

• **Wednesday, July 1, 2026**

09:00 - 10:00 | **Jacopo Perego** (Columbia University)
Privacy for Sale: Anarchy, Ban or Market? (joint with Piotr Dworczak and Laura Veldkamp)

10:00 - 10:30 | *Coffee break*

10:30 - 11:30 | **Pia Ennuschat** (Universitat Pompeu Fabra)
Targeted Information Design

11:30 - 12:30 | **Vasiliki Skreta** (UT Austin and UCL)
Audience Design with Transfers and Ordeals (joint with Suraj Malladi)

• **Thursday, July 2, 2026**

09:30 - 10:30 | **Kai Hao Yang** (Yale University)
Stochastic Optimization and Coupling (joint with Frank Yang)

10:30 - 11:00 | *Coffee break*

11:00 - 12:00 | **Eduardo Perez-Richet** (Sciences Po)
TBA

12:00 - 14:00 | *Lunch break*

14:00 - 15:00 | **Ian Ball** (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)
Competitive Sequential Screening (joint with Jan Knoepfle and Deniz Kattwinkel)

15:00 - 15:30 | *Coffee break*

15:30 - 16:30 | **Sulagna Dasgupta** (Cornell University)
TBA

16:30 - 17:30 | **Marek Pycia** (University of Zurich)
Mechanism Design with Information Leakage (joint with Samuel Häfner and Haoyuan Zeng)

from 19:00 on | *Dinner: Restaurant Nees*

• **Friday, July 3, 2026**

09:00 - 10:00 | **Paula Onuchic** (London School of Economics)
TBA

10:00 - 10:30 | *Coffee break*

10:30 - 11:30 | **Ilya Segal** (Stanford University)
The Limits of Auctions under Ex-Ante Collusion (joint with Ravi Jagadeesan and Alex Tordjman)

11:30 - 12:30

Ravi Jagadeesan (Stanford University)

Mechanism Design with Collusion: Welfare Guarantees under Property Rights (joint with Ilya Segal and Alex Tordjman)